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Abstract 
In this study, we investigated the influence of mood on a production scheduling managerial task by comparing 
the effects of positive and neutral mood on individual judgments and their accuracy. When the subjects have 
been exposed to the task and thus have gained experience doing the task, the subjects in a positive mood 
performed significantly better than the subjects in a neutral mood. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is often assumed that rational decisions are made in the absence of the influence of one’s feeling state. 
Psychological investigations, however, suggests that one’s feelings state can influence what comes to one’s 
mind first or most easily (for a detailed review see Isen, 1984) and what comes to one’s mind first or most 
easily can in turn influence one’s decisions and judgments (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Consequently, 
given the inherent importance of managerial judgments in organizations, it becomes crucial to investigate the 
role of mood in these types of judgments. Since people are always in a “sort of mood”, as Venkatesh and Speier 
(1999) aptly put it, and since these feeling states can influence one’s thought processes, it becomes of great 
importance to investigate whether the quality of complex managerial judgments can be influenced by the 
judge’s feeling state. 
The investigations that examine the impact of mood on judgment and decision making can roughly be 
categorized into two main groups: the first group investigates the impact of feelings states on decisions that do 
not involve risk (Clark and Isen 1982; Isen 1984, 1993, 2000) and the second group investigates the impact of 
feeling states on decisions that do involve risk (Au et al., 2003; Mellers, 2000; Lowenstein, et al., 2001). The 
line of research that considers decisions without the involvement of risk generally concentrates on the effects of 
immediate feeling states only (Clark and Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984, 1993). The line of research that investigates 
decision making under risk, on the other hand, usually focuses on the effects of anticipated feeling states on 
decisions (see the literature review in Lowenstein et al., 2001). Our paper falls under the first category 
mentioned above. That is, in this paper we examine the impact of positive mood (an immediate feeling state) 
on judgments that do not involve risk. In addition, we concentrate on a specific type of managerial judgment, 
which by its very nature requires complex cognitive processing.  
In the following sections we review the literature on judgment and mood, form some relevant hypotheses, and 
conduct an experiment to examine this issue directly. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
Judgment analysis is often grounded in Social Judgment Theory (for a detailed discussion see Hammond, 1975; 
Cooksey, 1996; Brehmer 1988). Judgment can be defined as a cognitive process in which a person draws a 
conclusion (a judgment) about something that he or she cannot see (a criterion) on the basis of a set of data 
(cues and or feedback) that he or she can see (Hammond, 1975). In other words when making a judgment, one 
has to estimate the relative importance of the given set of cues as well as their functional relationship to the 
criterion. Consequently, one can improve his or her judgmental performance by (1) adjusting one’s subjective 
weights of the given set of cues to match those of the task, (2) organizing the cue data in the appropriate way, 
and (3) applying these appropriately organized set of cues with a high degree of consistency (Hammond, 1975; 
Cooksey, 1996 p. 211). Clearly, the harder to predict a criterion, the more difficult it is to make an accurate 
judgment (Hammond, 1975; Cooksey, 1996 p. 209).  
The quantitative articulation of the above statement is expressed through the equation  
ra= G Rs Re + C √ (1-Re2) (1- Rs2)      (1) 
The first term in the above equation is considered the linear component and the second term is considered the 
configural or unmodeled component (Cooksey, 1996, p. 212). When all the relations in both cognitive and task 
systems are linear, the above equation is reduced to its linear component only (Brehmer, 1988, p. 23). Since all 
the relations in our system have a linear form, we use only the linear component of the above general form (i.e. 
ra= G Ra Re) and refer to it as the Lens Model Equation (LME) henceforth. In this equation, ra stands for the 
judgmental achievement, G for the knowledge of the task, Rs for the consistency in applying one’s chosen 
strategy, and Re for the task predictability or control (Cooksey, 1996, p. 210). It is important to note that the 
variable G or knowledge of the task does not refer to mastery of a subject area but to the subject’s knowledge of 
the requirements of the task and his or her ability to apply that knowledge to predicting the criteria (Stewart 
and Lusk, 1994).  
The coefficient ra (achievement) is measured through the correlation between the actual ecological criterion and 
the subject’s actual or subjective judgments (Cooksey, 1996, p. 210). The coefficient G (knowledge of the task) 
is measured through the correlation between the optimal values of the criterion (values predicted by the optimal 
model of the ecology) and judgment values predicted by the subject’s policy equation (Cooksey, 1996, p. 210). 
The coefficient Rs (consistency) is determined through the multiple correlations between cue values and the 
values of subjects’ actual judgments (Hammond, 1975). Finally, the coefficient Re (task predictability) is 
measured through the correlation between optimal and actual criterion values (Cooksey, 1996, p. 209). 
According to the above Lens Model Equation, to increase one’s achievement (ra) in a given judgment task, one 
has to increase his or her knowledge of the task (G) and/or consistency (Rs) in applying one’s chosen strategy 
(subjects have no control over Re or task predictability). Given the importance of managerial decisions, 
learning to improve one’s judgment calls for direct scientific examination of ways to improve the knowledge of 
the task as well as one’s consistency in applying the appropriate strategy.   
A growing body of research that indicates an enhancing effect of positive mood on cognition gives us reason to 
believe that positive mood may improve the performance of managerial judgment tasks. According to this line 
of research, positive mood can markedly and regularly influence one’s cognitive context and structure (Isen et 
al., 1978; Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen, 2000) and thus facilitate efficient decision-making (Isen and Means, 
1983; Isen, 2000) and creative problem solving (Isen et al., 1987; Isen, 2000). In the light of these studies, we 
believe that positive mood may help human judges to make more accurate judgments. In addition, we believe 
that positive mood may help judges to become more consistent in applying their chosen strategies.  
In the following sections, we review a series of studies on mood that will lead us to our hypotheses. We start 
with a brief definition to clarify how the term “mood” is used in this article and how it differs from the term 
“emotion”. Then, we explain why in this article we concentrate on the effects of positive mood only. Finally, we 
review relevant studies examining the effects of positive mood on cognitive systems and processes and explain 
why, due to these effects, we expect to detect improved performance in our judgment task.  
Mood and emotion, although both affective states, differ on the dimensions of "pervasiveness", "intensity", and 
"specificity" (Isen, 1984; Forgas, 1991; Moore and Isen, 1990). Emotions generally denote short-lived strong 
reactions that most often have both a specific cause (as in a provocative act) and a target (as in the target of 
anger). Mood, on the other hand, usually refers to a less intense and more diffused affective state, which is 
relatively enduring. Furthermore, moods seem not to be directed toward any particular object, target, or 
behavior (Moore and Isen, 1990; Lazarus, 1991, p. 48; Forgas, 1991).  
Although research has identified a broad range of specific moods such as sadness, fear, and arousal (Russell 
and Mehrrabian, 1977; Watson and Tellegen, 1985), Clark and Isen (1982), Osgood and Suci (1955), and 
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Schwarz and Clore (1988) argue that mood states can be grouped into more general or global categories such as 
positive, neutral, and negative. In this paper, we investigate the effects of positive and neutral mood states. 
In this article, we demonstrate the effects of positive mood on managerial judgments by contrasting it with the 
effects of neutral mood rather than the effects of negative mood. This choice was made based on the facts 
reported in the general mood literature. The mood literature suggests that positive mood exhibits more 
consistent effects than negative mood (Moore and Isen, 1990). For example, some studies have shown that only 
positive mood can increase the recall of mood congruent information (Isen, 1970; Mischel, Ebbeson, and Zeiss, 
1976, cited in Moore and Isen, 1990, p.13). However, other studies have shown that both positive and negative 
moods can increase the recall of mood congruent information (Teasdale and Fogarty, 1979, cited in Moore and 
Isen, 1990, p. 13). In other words, while in both lines of studies positive mood exhibit the same effect 
(increased recall of mood congruent information), negative mood fails to do so. Thus, together these studies 
suggest that the effects of positive mood are more consistent than those of negative mood (Moore and Isen, 
1990).  
In the following sections we briefly review the literature on the effects of positive mood on cognition.  
Recent psychological research suggests that feeling states and memory are intimately linked (Forgas, 2000, p. 
11; Isen, 2000, 1993; Isen et al., 1992). For example, a number of theories have argued that cognition and 
feeling states both are part of one single integrated cognitive representational system (Bower, 1981; Clark and 
Isen, 1982). According to these models each event, concept, and feeling state is represented by a node in a large 
network of material in memory and is connected through associative relations to other nodes. Isen (1984) 
argues that this network of cognitive material has a highly flexible structure, which may indeed change its 
organization depending on the retrieval cues such as a feeling state, present at the time of recall. Using this 
conceptualization (Isen, 1984), we explain in the following paragraphs how positive mood can influence one’s 
cognitive capability (i.e. context and structure) and thus facilitate creative problem solving. In addition, we 
explain how positive mood can influence one’s information processing style. 
A large number of studies suggest that positive mood can act as a fast and effective retrieval cue for the recall 
of positive memories (for a complete listing of this literature see Isen, 1985). On the other hand, numerous 
studies suggest that negative mood does not increase the recall of negative memories (Isen, 1970; Mischel, 
Ebbeson, and Zeiss, 1976, cited in Moore and Isen, 1990, p.13). Such asymmetry according to Isen (1985) may 
be due to the difference in the degree of interconnectivity as well as the organization of the network of negative 
and positive material in one’s memory. That is, the network of positive material may be more interconnected 
than the network of negative material in one’s cognitive system (Isen, 1984, 1985).  
Furthermore, literature reports that mood can influence the way cognitive elements in memory are grouped 
together (Isen, 1993, 2000). For example, it has been shown that people in positive mood are able to perceive a 
greater number of similarities among stimuli when they are asked to find similarities (Isen and Daubman, 
1984) and can find a greater number of differences when they are asked to do so (Murray et al., 1990). This 
ability to perceive a greater number of similarities as well as a greater number of differences among stimuli has 
been attributed to the cognitive organization and flexibility of people who are in a positive mood (Murray et al., 
1990; Isen, 1993, 2000). 
Positive mood has also been associated with increased creativity (Isen et al., 1987). According to Mednick 
(1962) creativity can be defined as the formation of unusual but useful associations. Isen, Daubman, and 
Nowicki (1987) argue that the rich and elaborately interconnected network of material in the memory of people 
with positive mood can facilitate their perception of new and unusual but useful associations (Isen et al., 1985), 
which in turn can assist them in their creative problem solving. 
Positive mood can also influence one’s information processing style (Forgas, 2000; Isen, 2000). For example, 
Isen and Means (1983) have shown that people in positive mood tend to make their selections without 
considering the same piece of information more than once when they are asked to make their decisions based 
on a given set of criteria. Isen, Rosenzweig, and Young (1991) have shown that people in positive mood tend to 
be thorough and efficient decision makers who exhibit significantly less confusion and greater integration of 
information when making decisions. Isen (1993, 2000) argues that this behavior may be due to the rich 
cognitive context of people in positive mood. That is, because of their rich cognitive context people in positive 
mood seem to be able to discern more dimensions of a task and thus recognize more possibilities for 
combination and integration (Isen, 1993, 2000).  
In short, the literature reports that people in positive mood tend to have a rich and flexibly organized cognitive 
context (Isen and Daubman, 1984, Isen, 1985, 1993, 2000; Murray et al., 1990), which can enable them to 
discern unusual but useful associations (Isen et al., 1985), and thus be creative and efficient problem solvers 
(Isen et al., 1987, Isen et al., 1991, Isen, 2000).  
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It is important to note that although positive mood enhances cognitive flexibly and context, as suggested by the 
literature discussed above, it does not always exhibit a facilitatory effect on performance. For example, Elsbach 
and Barr (1999) have found that positive mood can lead to an inferior performance when using structured 
decision protocols, and Au et al. (2003) have shown that the same is true for a foreign exchange trading task 
that involves risk. The tasks used in these studies (Elsbach and Barr 1999; Au et al., 2003) require a type of 
cognitive processing that could indeed be impaired by an enhanced cognitive context, as explained by the 
authors of these papers. Our study, however, pertains to the type of situations where enhanced cognitive context 
and flexibility can have a facilitatory effect on performance.  This is because improving a complex managerial 
judgment, involves discerning and estimating relationships between the cues and the criterion. Such a process 
(i.e. discerning and estimating relationships) can benefit from one’s rich and elaborately connected cognitive 
context as the discussed mood literature suggests.  
In the following section, we form three hypotheses. For each hypothesis we explain why we believe that 
positive mood can facilitate the behavioral effects that we expect to observe.  
3. HYPOTHESIS 
To improve their judgmental achievement, people need to adjust their subjective weights of a given set of cues 
to match those of the task. In addition, people need to form an appropriate strategy (i.e. organize the cue data in 
the appropriate way) and apply this strategy with a high degree of consistency. In other words, to increase their 
achievement (ra) they have to increase their knowledge of the task (G) and/or consistency (Rs) in applying their 
chosen strategy.  
Using the literature reviewed in the previous sections of this article, we form three hypotheses, which are 
discussed in the following sections. 
Literature reports that subjects in positive mood are less likely than their control counterparts to review 
information they had already encountered (Isen and Means, 1983), tend to be less overwhelmed by the task, 
and show less confusion during the decision making process (Isen et al., 1991). Isen (1993, 2000) argues that 
this behavior (being less overwhelmed and confused) of the people in positive mood may be due to their 
integrative style of decision processing, where integration is based on elaboration, greater differentiation, and 
better understanding of the issues at hand. 
Because of the above reported behavior (less overwhelmed, less confused, and not reviewing previously 
encountered information) we expect to observe that subjects in positive mood apply their judgmental policies 
differently from their control counterparts. That is, we expect them to be more consistent (Rs) in using their set 
of chosen cues and the weights that they have assigned to those cues. Therefore, we expect to reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of this alternative: 
The subjects in the positive mood group will exhibit significantly more consistency (higher 
Rs) in applying their chosen strategy than their neutral mood control counterparts. 
A growing body of literature indicates that positive mood influences the way our thoughts are organized and 
related to each other in our memory (Isen, 2000, 1993; Isen et al., 1992; Isen et al., 1985). Studies have shown 
that people in positive mood tend to have a more flexible cognitive structure than their control counterparts 
(Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1985; Murray et al., 1990). That is, people in positive mood seem to be 
able to discern more similarities as well as more differences between objects. Moreover, studies have shown 
that compared to their control counterparts, people in positive mood tend to discern more unusual but useful 
relationships among stimuli (Isen and Daubman, 1984; Isen et al., 1987). The ability to discern more 
relationships, especially the unusual but useful ones, is of great importance in a judgment task where one has to 
determine the relationship between cues and the criterion and attach the correct relative weights to cues. 
Therefore, we expect people in positive mood to be significantly better in adjusting their subjective weights of a 
given set of cues to match those of the task.  That is, we expect our subjects in positive mood to show a greater 
knowledge (G) of the task. Thus, we expect to reject the null hypothesis in favor of this alternative: 
The subjects in the positive mood group will exhibit significantly better knowledge of the 
task (higher G) than their neutral mood control counterparts. 
According to the Lens Model Equation (LME), greater knowledge of the task (G) and consistent use of a 
chosen strategy (Rs) will lead to better achievement (ra). Thus, based on the two previous hypotheses, we expect 
to see significantly higher achievement for our subjects in the positive mood group. Therefore, we expect to 
reject the null hypothesis in favor of this alternative: 
The subjects in the positive mood group will exhibit significantly higher achievement 
Decision Support in an Uncertain and Complex World: The IFIP TC8/WG8.3 International Conference 2004 
217 
(higher ra) than their neutral mood control counterparts. 
Managers generally prefer metrics other than those above (Makridakis, 1993). For example, performance can 
also be evaluated by measuring the accuracy of the judgments. Thus we will measure accuracy through 
examining the deviation of the judgments by the subjects from the optimal judgments (i.e. the mean absolute 
error of the judgments). For the same reasons that we discussed in the two previous hypotheses (greater 
cognitive flexibility, detecting more relationships among stimuli, discerning more unusual but useful 
relationships, being less confused and overwhelmed by the task, and greater understanding of the issues at 
hand), we expect the subjects in our positive mood group to make more accurate judgments. That is, we expect 
their judgments to exhibit less deviation from the optimal judgments. Therefore, we expect to reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of this alternative: 
 The mean absolute error of the judgments for the subjects in the positive mood group will 
be significantly lower than those of the control group. 
In the following sections we discuss our investigations. We start by giving an overview of our method followed 
by a report of the statistical analysis of the experimental data.  
4. METHOD 
The participants were 49 male and female undergraduate business students from two sections of a third year 
statistics course in a major land grant university. The subjects received class credit for their participation.  
First, participants were randomly assigned to two groups. The treatments (experimental and control) were then 
randomly assigned to these groups. The subjects in the experimental group were induced with positive mood. 
The subjects' mood in the control group was not manipulated.  
The task used in our experiment was based on Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon’s (1960) model of the 
production-scheduling problem. The problem in our task is to decide how many units to produce given an 
uncertain future demand and the knowledge of the current work force size, productivity, and inventory levels. 
The production-scheduling problem was selected because it is a managerially relevant problem, and it has been 
calibrated with actual data (Holt et al., 1956, p. 163). The equation modeling in the production-scheduling 
decision is as follows: 
(1) Production Decision =β02 + β12 * (work force last month) - β22 * (inventory on hand)+ β32 * (the current 
month’s demand) + β42 * (the demand for next month) + β52  * (the demand for two months ahead). 
The coefficients used in the above equation were estimated by Holt, Modigliani, and Muth (1956, p. 163) for 
the production-scheduling decision at Pittsburgh Plate Glass. The coefficients values were β02=148.5, 
β12=1.005, β22=0.464, β32=0.464, β42=0.239, and β52=0.113. The randomness added to the task was normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 133. Task difficulty, measured through the 
correlation between the values of the optimal and actual criterion, was relatively low (average Re = 0.76).  
There were 30 trials in our experiment. In each trial, the subjects were provided with five cues (the current 
month’s demand, the demand for next month, the demand for two months ahead, current work force size, and 
inventory on hand) on which to base their decision to set the current production level. All cues were normally 
distributed. These cues were randomly distributed with the following mean and standard deviations: current 
month (Mean= 2500, SD= 200), next month (Mean= 2500, SD= 200), two months ahead (Mean= 2500, SD= 
400), work force (Mean= 440.92, SD= 17.64), and inventory on hand (Mean= 300, SD= 100). 
The task was presented to the subjects via desktop computers. The subjects made their judgments by adjusting a 
slider or using a scrollbar to set their desired value. A small window on the bottom right corner of the screen 
displayed a message to encourage subjects to do their best. A judgment was submitted by clicking the button “I 
am satisfied with my current decision.” Once this button was pushed the subject’s judgment, the optimal 
judgment, and the percentage error of the subject’s judgment (outcome feedback) was displayed in a dedicated 
section of the screen. A short history of the subject’s five most recent judgments along with the optimal 
judgment and the percentage error were also displayed. At the same time, the window that displayed the 
motivational message was replaced by another window displaying the optimal value in a large font and a button 
labeled as “OK to Continue”. This button was used to start a new trial (i.e. a new set of randomly determined 
and statistically independent cue values). Once subjects submitted a judgment (after they started a new trial 
and/or after clicking the button “I am satisfied with my decision”) they were unable to go back. That is, the task 
was designed in a way to prevent subjects from accessing previous screens or changing their previous 
judgments. 
Consistent with prior research (Isen et. al., 1978, 1987, 1992), subjects in the experimental group received a 
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surprise gift of chocolate and candy wrapped in colorful paper a few minutes prior to performing the task. Once 
again, consistent with prior research (Isen et. al., 1978; Isen et al., 1987; Isen et al., 1992), mood manipulation 
was disguised by presenting the surprise gift as a small token of appreciation. The participants in the control 
group did not receive a surprise gift. 
Consistent with prior research (Isen and Gorgolione, 1983; Kraiger et al., 1989; Elsbach and Barr, 1999), we 
used a self-report survey to measure the feeling state of our subjects. We asked our subjects to rate on a five-
point scale, (with 1 denoting "strongly disagree", 3 denoting "neutral", and 5 "strongly agree") how each of the 
words "pleased", "happy", and "glad" described their current mood. The words on our survey (pleased, happy, 
and glad) were adopted from the set of words used on the mood manipulation survey by Elsbach and Barr 
(1999). To measure positive mood, Elsbach and Barr (1999) employed words that described feeling states 
moderate in the dimension of arousal but high in the dimension of pleasantness. Elsbach and Barr further 
showed that the items on their survey were strongly related. They used these items, which measured specific 
mood states (glad, happy, etc.), to measure the global positive mood by grouping these items into one category 
and calculating their composite score. 
We verified the internal reliability of the items “happy”, “pleased”, and “glad”, reported by Elsbach and Barr, 
using the reliability coefficient (rtt) described in Kerlinger (1992, p. 410). Our test of reliability shows a strong 
relationship among the items “happy”, “pleased”, and “glad” (rtt=0.882). 
This experiment was conducted over two days (Tuesday and Thursday) of the same week. The same person 
gave the instructions to both groups. To ensure consistency, the instructions were read from a written script. 
The possibility of mood contamination (i.e. the subjects on Thursday learn about the surprise gift given on 
Tuesday) was eliminated by conducting the control part of the experiment first. All subjects were instructed not 
to talk about the experiment to anyone until the following week after the experiment was completed.  
On the day of the experiment, the participants gathered in their classroom. Upon arrival, the subjects received a 
card with a randomly assigned seat number typed on it. The random seat numbers were used to eliminate 
situations that might have possibly affected the mood of our subjects (e.g. sitting near a friend or in a favorite 
spot). Subjects were informed that this experiment investigated managerial decision making. They were told 
that the software package that they were about to use was designed to assist managers in making decisions. To 
motivate subjects to do their best, they were told that by doing their best to make a decision, whether accurate 
or not, they would provide invaluable input for our investigations and will help us to improve our software 
package. 
The subjects were given a short tutorial of the task. During this, tutorial they were told that they would 
encounter a survey, which is part of a standard method of evaluating software packages and is routinely used. It 
is customary in mood studies to disguise the nature of the experimental manipulation. Thus consistent with 
prior research (Kraiger et al., 1989, Mackie and Worth, 1989; Isen et al., 1987), our subjects were told that the 
mood survey that they would encounter would be used to measure something other than their mood. After the 
tutorial, the subjects in the experimental group received a surprise gift of candy and chocolate. The subjects in 
the control group did not receive a gift. The subjects were then asked to go to their designated computers in the 
computer lab. 
In the computer lab, the subjects activated the software package that included two practice trials, the mood 
survey, and the actual task that consisted of 30 trials. The software was designed in a way that participants had 
to complete the mood manipulation survey followed by practice trials before they could start the actual task. 
After finishing the task, the subjects were debriefed and asked to leave the room. The entire procedure did not 
exceed one hour. 
5. RESULTS 
To assess changes in the performance of a judgment task, it is customary to examine subjects’ performance in 
blocks of trials (e.g. Gillis, 1975). Thus, to examine the effect of mood on judgmental performance in this study 
we divided our 30 trial task into two blocks of 15 trials. During the second block of trials, subjects have already 
been exposed to the task and thus have gained experience using the task. According to prior research (Remus, 
1984, 1987; Remus and Kottemann, 1987), subjects use the first trials (roughly about 12 trials) to gain 
experience with the task and adopt a decision strategy. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the performance 
during the second block of our 30 trial task is representative of better quality judgments. We expect to observe 
improved consistency (Rs) as well as improved achievement (ra), knowledge of the task (G), and accuracy of the 
judgments as articulated in our hypotheses. 
Consistent with prior research (Kraiger et al., 1989; Elsbach and Barr, 1999), we calculated the composite 
mood score of the items (happy, glad, and pleased) on our survey for each subject. That is, we added the ratings 
Decision Support in an Uncertain and Complex World: The IFIP TC8/WG8.3 International Conference 2004 
219 
for each of the three items on the survey to calculate a single mood composite score for each subject. We then 
compared the mean of these composite mood scores for our two treatment groups. As expected and confirmed 
by the one tailed t-test, the mean of the composite mood scores for the positive mood group (mean=11.24) was 
significantly higher (t=1.959, df= 47, p=0.028) than the mean of the composite mood scores for the neutral 
mood group (mean= 10.00). In other words, these results attest that positive mood was successfully induced. 
Isen, Clark, and Schwarz (1976) have shown that the effects of positive mood induced with a small surprise gift 
lasts for approximately 20 minutes. Although in our study no specific time limit for completing the task was 
given, all the subjects finished the experiment before the expected time (the entire procedure including 
instructions, mood manipulation and task did not exceed one hour). On the average, the subjects finished the 
task in less than 20 minutes with task duration mean of 18.25 minutes for the positive mood group and 16.83 
minutes for the neutral mood group. 
In the following sections we analyze the impact of mood on participants’ judgments in the last block of 15 trials 
of our 30 trial task. Prior to this block, the subjects have already been exposed to the task and thus have gained 
experience doing the task. Because of this, as we have argued before, this second block of trials is more 
representative of better quality judgments. Regression analysis was used for each subject to capture their policy. 
We anticipate seeing a significant difference in judgmental performance between our two groups.  
As mentioned before, hypothesis one proposes that people in positive mood will be significantly more 
consistent (will exhibit higher Rs) when applying their judgmental strategies. We captured the multiple 
correlations between the cue values and the values of subjects’ actual judgments for the last 15 trials. We then 
compared the Fisher r transformed values for these multiple correlations. The one tail t-test revealed a 
significant difference (t=-1.77, df=47, p=0.04) between the mean of the Fisher transformed r values of the 
positive mood group (mean=1.79) and neutral mood group (mean=1.49). The result thus confirms that the 
subjects in positive mood were significantly more consistent in applying their judgment policy than their 
control counterparts in the second block of trials of our judgment task. 
Hypothesis two proposes that the subjects in the positive mood group will exhibit significantly better knowledge 
of the task (higher G) than their neutral mood control counterparts. As in the Part I of our analysis, we 
measured G (knowledge of the task) through the correlation between the optimal values of the criterion and 
judgment values predicted by the subject’s policy equation (Cooksey, 1996, p. 210). Contrary to what we 
expected to observe, however, the one tailed t-test did not reveal a significant difference (t=-0.34, df=47, 
p=0.37) between the mean of the Fisher transformed values (transformed G’s) of the positive mood group 
(mean=1.16) and the neutral mood group (mean=1.12). Thus, our analysis did not support this hypothesis for 
the second block of trials of our judgment task. 
The first part of hypothesis three proposes that the subjects in the positive mood group will exhibit significantly 
higher achievement (higher ra) than their neutral mood control counterparts. To measure achievement we used 
the correlation between the actual criterion and the subject’s actual or subjective judgments (Cooksey, 1996, p. 
210) as we did in the Part I of our analysis. We transformed the ra values using Fisher r transformation prior to 
the analysis. The one tailed t-test revealed a significant difference (t=-1.71, df=47, p=0.047) between the mean 
of the Fisher transformed r values (transformed ra) of the positive mood group (mean=0.71) and the neutral 
mood group (mean=0.57). Thus, our experiment supported this hypothesis for the second block of trials of the 
judgment task. 
The second part of hypothesis three proposes that the subjects in the positive mood group will make 
significantly more accurate judgments than their neutral mood control counterparts. Accuracy was measured 
using the deviation of the judgments from the correct answer (i.e. the mean absolute error of the judgments for 
each subject). The one tailed t-test revealed that the mean of the absolute error in the positive mood group 
(mean=108.87) was significantly lower (t= 2.95, df=733, p= 0.003) than the mean of the absolute error in the 
neutral mood group (mean=129.10). Thus the one tailed t-test confirmed that people in positive mood made 
significantly more accurate decisions than their control counterparts in the second block of trials in our 
judgment task. 
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
The results of our analysis reflect an enhancing effect of positive mood on judgment accuracy, consistency and 
achievement. This is when subjects had already been exposed to the task and thus have gained experience 
doing the task (which we argue is more representative of better quality judgments). As we expected, positive 
mood improved the consistency, achievement as well as the accuracy of the judgments being made. However, 
contrary to what we expected, these effects did not reflect improvement in acquiring knowledge of the task.  
In short, the results of our study indicate that although positive mood significantly improved performance in 
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the second half of the task. As we mentioned previously, we expected that Isen’s (1984) theory to be 
independent of a subject’s experience with the task and thus apply to both blocks. However, contrary to what 
we expected, the result showed that Isen’s theory (1984) applied only to the second block of trials. The second 
block, however, contains judgments after gaining experience with the task and thus is more representative of 
the subjects’ better part of the work (i.e. improved judgments). Since the results show that the performance of 
the positive mood group was significantly better than their control counterpart during the block where subjects 
did their better part of the work, the results show that positive mood did indeed have an impact on the subjects’ 
ability to improve their judgments.  
These results have important theoretical implications for managerial decision making models. First, The results 
show significant improvement in areas where a number of decision making studies reported to be problematic 
(e.g. Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Brehmer and Brehmer, 1988, p. 97-103; Lim and O’Connor, 1996). 
Second, the results show that when making a complex managerial judgment, one’s feeling state matters. In 
other words, the results help to establish mood as a mediating variable in individual managerial decision 
making theories.  
The results of this study have important practical implications as well. As discussed previously, this study 
shows that human judges, under the influence of positive mood, can significantly improve their judgmental 
performance. Thus, organizations can benefit from such improved performance by paying attention to the 
feeling states of their decision makers. One may argue, however, that it is not practical to manage an 
individual’s moods in an organization. After all, moods are malleable. An individual’s mood can and are 
affected by events outside the control of an organization (stress at home, traffic, etc.). However, Isen and 
Daubman (1984) have shown than simple accommodations, such as providing comfortable chairs and 
refreshments in an experimental setting, can successfully induce positive mood. Thus, it is reasonable to believe 
that through a positive organizational climate, it is possible to create an environment where employees find 
themselves in a positive mood, which in turn enables them to deliver more accurate judgments and 
consequently better decisions.  
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